

10 Oct 1967

Memo D/OER

From [REDACTED] OCI STATINTL

1. Review of Hardy hearing leaves following questions in need of answer, to backstop Director in Q&A portions:

- A. Do Chinese Communists at present (or in recent past) provide any significant portion of military aid to North Koreans?
- B. Question was asked about Japanese trade with US and ChiComs respectively; DCI, using Basic Intelligence Factbook, cited Japanese exports and imports alike 7% with "Communist countries," 36% exports and imports with "North America."

Would like to substitute: In 1966 _____ percent of Japan's total trade was with Communist China, as compared to _____ % with the United States. From China's point of view, however, trade with Japan is more significant, representing _____ % of total Chinese trade. Japan, in fact, last year replaced the Soviet Union as China's principal trading partner. (Correct?)

Could somebody phone me those answers as soon as they are available, as DCI is waiting for our review of the briefing record.

Thanks,

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[REDACTED] X 7610
Red 9380

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060004-7

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The USSR, Communist China,
And the Origins of the Korean War

All available evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union planned and directed the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The North Korean regime was a purely Soviet creation and a full-fledged Soviet satellite. Its armed forces were organized, trained, and equipped entirely by the USSR. Soviet control was assured by the presence of Soviet advisers at all levels of the North Korean Army and government. Many key North Korean party and government officials, moreover, had been Soviet citizens or served in the Soviet Army during World War II. Purges and demotions between 1945 and 1950 had eliminated those Koreans who had returned from China or were oriented toward the Chinese Communist Party.

Stalin's decision to launch the Korean venture appears to have been prompted, on the one hand, by his paranoiac suspicion that the US intended to restore Japan as a strong military power in northeast Asia and, on the other, by his confidence that the North Koreans could score a quick victory without provoking American intervention.

By late 1949, the US had made clear its readiness to by-pass Soviet obstructionist tactics and conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan. Stalin, therefore, was determined to slam the door against what he viewed as an emerging US-Japanese anti-Soviet alliance by seizing the entire Korean Peninsula--the historic Japanese gateway to the Asian mainland. In early 1950, Soviet propaganda was filled with allegations that the US planned to "revive Japanese militarism and imperialism."

Stalin unquestionably anticipated a quick and easy conquest of South Korea. ROK forces were markedly inferior to those of the North in manpower, equipment, and training. North Korean espionage, military probes, and subversion had further reduced South Korean effectiveness. American forces had been withdrawn from South Korea in mid-1949 and the Soviet strategists undoubtedly discounted the possibility

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of a US military response. Stalin's confidence in an easy victory had been strengthened by public statements by American leaders in 1949 and early 1950 which left South Korea outside the US "defense perimeter" in the Pacific.

The Chinese Communists almost certainly had advance knowledge of the North Korean attack. Both the details of this plan, and the broader question of the threat of a resurgent Japan, probably were discussed by Mao and Stalin during the Chinese leader's ten-week visit to Moscow in early 1950. The Chinese evidently shared Soviet concern over the prospect of a close alliance between the US and a re-armed Japan. Peking echoed Moscow's attacks against the US "plot" to revive Japanese militarism. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed in February 1950, was specifically directed against "the revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression."

In addition to similar propaganda lines, evidence of Chinese knowledge and approval of the Soviet plan for a swift North Korean strike against the South included the return to North Korea in February 1950 of Koreans who had served in the Chinese Communist Army--at a time when the North Korean forces were beginning the transition to a war footing. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Chinese leaders foresaw serious risks of becoming involved in the war. They apparently shared Stalin's judgment that the US would have no choice but to acquiesce in a quick and decisive North Korean victory.

The Chinese were anxious to deny Korea to American and Japanese power, for they regarded the peninsula as a forward shield protecting their vital industrial centers in Manchuria and the political center of North China. In the spring of 1950, however, the Chinese Communist leaders were preoccupied primarily with plans for the conquest of Taiwan and Tibet and the consolidation of their power in southern and central China--areas in which anti-Communist guerrillas were still active. The Chinese, therefore, hoped that a swift North Korean victory and a

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demonstration of American inaction would hasten the collapse of Chinese Nationalist morale and resistance, thus opening the way for the early "liberation" of Taiwan.

When the unexpected American military intervention shattered the Communists' calculations and confronted them with the imminent destruction of the North Korean regime, a Soviet diktat was not needed to bring the Chinese into the war. Peking's decision to intervene was based on the Chinese leaders' own view of the threat to their security posed by the presence of a powerful enemy on China's doorstep. The Chinese, of course, exploited the emergency to extract large-scale military assistance from the Soviet Union, but the decision to intervene appears to have been basically a Chinese decision.

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NOTE DDI:

1. Herewith copy of Hardy transcript. DCI specifically asked that you and I go over it personally to make sure that he was answering correctly in his ad lib sections--as far as substantive content is concerned--after which he will also review to determine how he wants to be recorded on policy questions.

STATINTL a) [REDACTED] notes that Subcommittee staff would not care to have it known around Community that we got our hands on text to review it, prefer that transcript not be shown to anybody but DCI---hence limit those we have to consult or call in.

STATINTL b) [REDACTED] for his part goes to major lengths to conceal from committee that we have made a copy.

STATINTL 2. Reporter left out 15 pages of text on Chicom armed forces which [REDACTED] will have re-inserted.

3. I have been over transcript and checked it out against briefing text, leaving following ad lib and Q&A sections: (paperclipped at start) AA. 673 line 1 to 695/23

- *A. p.696 line 25 to 698/24
- *B. p.702 line 20 to 706/6
- *C. p.711 line 16 to 712/8
- *D. p.719 line 1 to 720/4
- *E. p.724 line 19 to 731/7
- F. p.734 line 3 to 744/22
- G. p.748 line 12 to 757/3
- H. p.759 line 4 to end of transcript.

4. In those marked above with an asterisk, I suggest there is nothing we need to check out. On remainder, my suggestions are attached.

STATINTL
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AA. Page 673, line 1 to page 695, line 23.

DCI will probably want to consider wording of p. 678, lines 1-14. P. 680, starting at line 11, DCI might wish to reduce this to flat statement along lines: I am not the person to answer that question for you....State Department has a very strong feeling that commitment of Nationalist Chinese forces in South Vietnam would be a poor thing to do politically. The Chinese Nationalists do have excellent armed forces." P. 688, lines 4-13, another section for DCI's review.

F. Page 734, line 3 to page 744, line 22.

DCI will want to review refs to U.S. diplomatic policy, 734, lines 21, to 735 line 3, and p. 737, lines 4-9.

Japanese trade figures, bottom of p. 735 and top of 736, were pulled from Basic Fact Book; OER might wish to make answer more precise and more responsive (e.g., Japanese trade with U.S. and with Communist China, rather than with "North America" and "Communist Countries." I thought myself Japan share of ChiCom trade was considerably more significant, approaching it from ChiCom rather than from Japan percentage, but didn't have it readily avbl.)

I don't believe our Japanese analysts would differ with DCI's answers on Japanese attitudes 741/14 to 744/22.

G. Page 748 line 12 to page 757 line 3.

I can't vouch for answer p. 749 line 25 that all military aid to North Korea comes from Soviets.

H. Page 759, line 4 to end.

Page 760, lines 4 to 12: which way did the Burma Road go, and which way did Vinegar Joe go?

Page 761, lines 4 to 6: It might be advisable to moderate ref to importance of Malaysian troops inasmuch as OBI Factbook credits them with army of only 28,400, one of smallest in area, and they are quite dependent on Commonwealth (Aust. & NZ) backing.

Page 764, lines 6-17, DCI again referring to Agency's non-role in policy.

cbc